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WEAPONIZING THE EPA: PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL AND
WICKED PROBLEMS
CRAIG A. JONES *
"Traditionally, it has been conservative Republicans who warned about the
need to check the power of a president lest he become dictatorial, while
liberal Democrats lobbied for a strong chief executive. Today the two
camps essentially have switched sides." 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
In its broadest sense, presidential control encompasses all the actions, in both
word and deed, whereby presidents “go it alone” to adopt policies in the absence
of congressional will to do so, and sometimes directly contrary to it. Such actions
include using the “bully pulpit” of the executive office to rhetorically set the agenda,

*
Craig Jones is a doctoral candidate in Boise State University’s School of Public Service and is
on track to receive his PhD in Public Policy and Administration in spring 2020. The author would like to thank
his family for their support and patience, his dissertation committee for their support and guidance, and
especially his committee chair, Dr. Jen Schneider, whose support, encouragement, and mentorship have
been invaluable. Finally, the author would like to thank the editors of the Idaho Law Review for their interest
in this topic and dedication in preparing the article for publication. All errors in style or substance are entirely
the author’s.
1. Gerald F. Seib, Presidential Power -- Limits of Power: Is President’s Authority Being Nibbled
Away? Many in the GOP Say So --- They Rebel as Congress Curbs Office in Numerous Ways; Democrats Scoff
at Notion --- Cry of Remember Watergate, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter Limits of Power].
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frame issues, and mobilize the populace. 2 They also include all the tools the unitary
executive has at his or her disposal to set and shape policy, including, among other
things, executive orders, budgets, presidential memoranda, signing statements, appointment powers, and agency rulemaking. And while partisan views on presidential power and prerogative shift over time, as the above quote indicates, the fact
remains that all modern presidents utilize formal and informal power to their advantage. While the use or abuse of power is frequently in the eye of the partisan
beholder, 3 the tools of presidential control are valued by each modern executive
entering the Oval Office. Thus, while perspectives on presidential control change
with shifting political winds, campaign rhetoric notwithstanding, the practice of
presidential control does not. 4 It is precisely this enduring presence that makes
presidential control an important area of study.
To be sure, presidential control has been extensively studied from various angles in such diverse academic disciplines as public administration, public policy, political science, law, psychology, and communications. The attention by scholars is
well deserved. Like few other actions by citizens and policymakers alike, the way in
which presidential control is exercised can fundamentally shape the process by
which polices are adopted and implemented. This has important implications for
both governance and our foundational democratic principles. The aspects of presidential control this study examines are the coordinated use of the bully pulpit and
control of administrative agencies, respectively, to promote and adopt policies
apart from congressional action. Thanks to existing scholarship, we know much
about how presidents frequently act through administrative agencies in pursuit of
policy goals—originally coined the “Administrative Presidency” by Richard Nathan. 5
2. The term “bully pulpit” is attributed to Teddy Roosevelt who famously observed, “Most of
us enjoy preaching, and I’ve got such a bully pulpit.” THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE WINNING OF THE WEST: AN
ACCOUNT OF THE EXPLORATION AND SETTLEMENT OF OUR COUNTRY FROM THE ALLEGHENIES TO THE PACIFIC, at vi (1917);
David Greenberg, Theodore Roosevelt and the Image of Presidential Activism, 78 JOHNS HOPKINS U. PRESS
1057, 1067–68 (2011). The term “bully pulpit” is especially appropriate in this context because, as Greenberg notes:
No president before him had made such regular, skillful use of this declamatory vehicle, which
Roosevelt, by naming, fairly invented; no one to that point so acutely discerned or eagerly
seized the opportunity, afforded simply by being president, to command attention with rousing, morally laden speeches. Roosevelt used speeches about policy and legislation to circumvent Congress—to lead from the White House.
Id. (emphasis added).
3. In reflecting on the often subjective views of power, political scientist John Gaus observed
that “how one feels about power depends on whether one has it.” Donald F. Kettl, Public Administration at
the Millennium: The State of the Field, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. AND THEORY 7, 16 (Jan. 2000). This is certainly
true for the way presidential control is viewed by citizens and politicians alike who find themselves at various
times on opposite sides of the argument depending on who’s in office, the issue at hand, or both.
4. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The Political Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985) [hereinafter Moe, The Political Presidency]; David E. Lewis,
Revisiting the Administrative Presidency: Policy, Patronage, and Agency Competence, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 60, 60–73 (2009); Dan B. Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801, 801–28 (1991); Richard W. Waterman, The Administrative Presidency, Unilateral Power, and the Unitary Executive Theory, 39 UNIV. KY. 5, 5–9 (2009).
5. See RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983). The term was first used by Richard Nathan in 1976 in The Public Interest Journal. See Richard P. Nathan, The “Administrative Presidency”, 44 PUB. INT. 40 (1976), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/the-administrative-
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We also know a great deal about how presidents use their position to frame policy
goals, set the agenda, and “speak over the heads of Congress” to promote those
very same goals—referred to as the “Rhetorical Presidency” by Jeffrey Tulis. 6 However, we may be missing important insights about the interplay, or perhaps co-production, of these presidential prerogatives because administrative action and rhetoric typically are not studied simultaneously. Using the “wicked problem” of climate
change as it relates to the adoption of federal greenhouse gas regulations under
the Obama Administration, this article aims to bring these two familiar phenomena
together to take a fresh look into what they have to say about governance and democratic principles. 7
Because of the divisive and often politically charged nature of wicked problems, they tend to accentuate both the rhetoric and actions surrounding them, and
few policy problems in the United States rise to the level of climate change in this
regard. As a result, climate policy offers a helpful window through which to study
how President Obama utilized administrative and rhetorical strategies and tools to
pivot away from climate change legislation that had stalled in the Senate in 2009. 8
In particular, the study addresses how Obama rhetorically constructed and rationalized his use of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement federal
climate change regulations via the federal Clean Power Plan. 9 Among the insights
revealed by this analysis are how Obama viewed the role of the bureaucracy, particularly in an age of tremendous political polarization, how he invoked executive
power, and what his actions reveal about executive views of democratic institutions
presidency. However, Nathan is commonly cited from his book by the same name published in 1983; thus,
this author follows the ordinary convention of citing the 1983 work.
6. JEFFREY TULIS ET AL., THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 4 (1987).
7. See Rittel & Webber, infra note 18. The term “wicked problem” is borrowed from a study
addressing complex urban planning and infrastructure projects in the 1970s. In the study, the authors distinguish more ordinary technical or engineering problems from “wicked problems” that by comparison are
more difficult to resolve because they are value-laden, divisive, expensive, and lack easily identifiable solutions. A number of scholars have used the term in relation to natural resource conflicts, including climate
change, and it remains an apt descriptor of climate change and climate change policy. See, e.g., Martin Nie,
The Underappreciated Role of Regulatory Enforcement in Natural Resource Conservation, 41 POL’Y SCI. 139,
139–64 (June 2008); Mark K. McBeth et al., Buffalo Tales: Interest Group Policy Stories in Greater Yellowstone, 43 POL’Y SCI. 391, 391–409 (Dec. 2010).
8. The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (also called the Waxman-Markey Bill),
which would have established a federal CO2 cap-and-trade program, passed the House of Representatives
on June 26, 2009 by a vote of 219-212—the first bill of its kind addressing possible threats from climate
change passed in either chamber of Congress. See John M. Broder, House Passes Bill to Address Threat of
TIMES
(June
26,
2009),
https://web.arClimate
Change,
N.Y.
chive.org/web/20120101085737/http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/us/politics/27climate.html?_r=1&hp. The bill, however, was not presented in the Senate for either discussion or a vote. In
the face of insurmountable opposition, including among Democrats, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, a
Democrat from Nevada, chose not to present the bill to the full Senate. After pulling the bill from consideration, Reid commented, “It’s easy to count to 60. I could do it by the time I was in eighth grade. My point is
this, we know where we are. We know we don’t have the votes [for a bill capping emissions]. This is a step
forward.” See Coral Davenport & Darren Samuelsohn, Dems Pull Plug on Climate Bill, POLITICO (July 22, 2010),
https://www.politico.com/story/2010/07/dems-pull-plug-on-climate-bill-040109.
9. Lisa Friedman & Brad Plumer, E.P.A. Announces Repeal of Major Obama-Era Carbon Emissions Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/climate/clean-powerplan.html.
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and norms. 10 Understanding such views is particularly relevant since executive action tends to be easier to revise than congressional action, leading to a relatively
less durable and more fluid state of regulatory oversight. Indeed, the Trump administration is now actively engaged in rescinding and replacing the Clean Power Plan,
essentially stripping it of its most impactful regulations, through similar unilateral
actions. 11 Again, presidential control is not “owned” or abused by any particular
political ideology, and this example underscores that control is more about policy
than it is about party.
As mentioned, the “administrative presidency” and the “rhetorical presidency” are commonly treated as two separate and distinct areas of scholarship, although they are certainly complementary—like two sides of a coin, as some scholars
have noted. 12 However, the two sides may have a compounding influence on one
another that alters the dynamic of presidential control in important ways. As a result, it may be more descriptive and helpful to think about the administrative and
rhetorical presidency as notes on a sheet of music that are arranged and emphasized in various ways, at various times, to affect the composition and adoption of
policy. By viewing the administrative and rhetorical presidency in this way, the possibility of a more interactive relationship between the two themes of presidential
control becomes easier to visualize. As this article will demonstrate, adopting this
perspective and studying the two in concert reveals distinct shifts in rhetoric that
correspond with and signal Obama’s switch to administrative action. Such shifts are
at least muted by treating the two strands of scholarship separately. With this in
mind, it is important to consider that the two combined may very well magnify presidential influence in ways that have been understudied. 13 What we see from presidents today seems to be a historically significant amplification of presidential power
accompanied by a concomitant breakdown in legislative deliberation. Follow-on effects include deep political polarization along with dramatic swings in policy, which
act as both positive and negative feedback loops. 14

10. See id.
11. See infra notes 26–27. Although executive action via rulemaking allows opportunities to impart new interpretations of existing rules, it is a more arduous task because of the stringent requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act. See generally CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING:
HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY (CQ Press 4th ed. 2011).
12. Sidney M. Milkis, The Rhetorical and Administrative Presidencies, in RETHINKING THE RHETORICAL
PRESIDENCY 167, 167–89 (JEFFREY FRIEDMAN & SHTERNA FRIEDMAN eds., 2012).
13. ANDREW B. WHITFORD & JEFF YATES, PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE PUBLIC AGENDA: CONSTRUCTING
THE WAR ON DRUGS (2009); see also Milkis, supra note 12.
14. See ALAN I. & KYLE L. SAUNDERS, IS POLARIZATION A MYTH? 542–55 (2008); Roger Pielke Jr., Pielke
on Climate #12, CLIMATE FIX (July 1, 2018), https://theclimatefix.wordpress.com/2018/07/01/pielke-on-climate-12/. Other scholars argue that deep polarization of the American electorate is generally overstated.
See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA xiii (2nd ed. 2010) (“Americans are closely divided, but we are not deeply divided, and we are closely divided because many of us are
ambivalent and uncertain, and consequently reluctant to make firm commitments to parties, politicians, or
policies. We divide evenly in elections or sit them out entirely because we instinctively seek the center while
the parties and candidates hang out on the extremes.”). For a good discussion of positive and negative
feedback loops in policymaking, see FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS (2d ed. 2009).
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Indeed, as this study reveals, the rhetorical presidency is often used to rationalize the use of the administrative presidency, meaning that neither can be examined separately if we are to understand them fully. By examining these two areas
of presidential control together as the administrative-rhetorical presidency we gain
a deeper and richer understanding about the way in which presidents—President
Obama in this case—wield these powerful policy tools. 15 This article serves as a
starting point for doing just that and proceeds with the following outline. Part I defines the problem addressed by the study and lays the foundation for the central
research question. In Part II, the article highlights the nature of climate policy in the
United States, presidential action to address it, and the scholarly foundation and
framework for the research, including discussions of the administrative and rhetorical presidencies. Part III sets forth the methodology of the study, and Part IV addresses the research findings. Finally, in Part V, the implications of the study’s findings will be discussed, as well as some concluding thoughts and recommendations
for follow-up on research.
II. PART I: DEFINING THE PROBLEM
In this Part, the article introduces the use of presidential control to address
the wicked problem of climate change. As will be discussed, presidential control is
primarily about seeking to control policy outcomes by whatever means necessary.
While there are a multitude of tools that presidents may utilize to control policies,
this study is focused on administrative action through executive agencies, sometimes referred to in this article as “the bureaucracy,” and presidential rhetoric.
These two aspects of control commonly fall under the broader literature of the “Administrative Presidency” and the “Rhetorical Presidency,” and their use raises questions about the proper role of the bureaucracy in policymaking and the ramifications of the ongoing trend of presidents “going public,” 16 which are discussed in
greater detail in Part II.
At its most fundamental level, the story of administrative action in the United
States is a story about the competitive control of its policies. 17 While this is certainly
true for policies that garner little attention outside those who are following them
closely, it is especially true for high-profile policy problems that are by nature difficult to resolve, divisive, value laden, and therefore, political in nature. Rittel and
Webber originally referred to such problems as “wicked,” 18 because in contrast to
strictly technical problems, wicked problems are difficult to define, defy resolution,
and teem with often conflicting values. 19 In their original work, Rittel and Webber
discussed wicked problems in the context of urban planning. 20 However, as is the
case with certain social policy issues (i.e., abortion, gun control, and immigration),
15. Milkis, supra note 12. See also WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 13.
16. See, e.g., SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP ix (2006).
17. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2,245, 2,245–85 (2001).
18. Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 POL’Y
SCI. 155, 155–69 (1973).
19. McBeth et al., supra note 7, at 391–409.
20. Rittel & Weber, supra note 18.
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some environmental policy issues exhibit wicked characteristics. As described by
Nie, wicked environmental problems are “value-based political conflicts grounded
in deep core human values.… [Such problems are] acrimonious, symbolic, intractable, divisive, and expensive.” 21 They also defy easy problem definitions and, therefore, clearly defined and generally accepted solutions as well. Not surprisingly, then,
wicked problems are prone to political influences, 22 and by logical extension, presidential administrative action, or what Nathan called the “Administrative Presidency.” 23
Such is the case with federal climate change regulations. The focus of this
study begins during the period when President Obama directed the EPA to implement the Clean Power Plan, using a relatively novel interpretation of relevant Clean
Air Act (CAA) statutes. 24 The Clean Power Plan followed a series of international
efforts, executive orders, and policy documents set forth by the Obama Administration. It was designed to cap CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel electric generating units
and mandated a 32% reduction in CO2 emissions from 2005 levels by 2030. 25 Two
years later, the Trump Administration directed the EPA to rescind the Clean Power
Plan, and the agency has now proposed a new rule to replace it with a revised, less
stringent, and less prescriptive application of the CAA statutes on which it is
based. 26 This “whipsaw” action has implications for industry, environmental and
economic interests, and the public by creating an uncertain regulatory environment, governed by special interest lobbying and litigation instead of institutions and
rules. 27
The federal climate regulation case therefore also has important implications
for democracy, including how it affects government accountability and responsibility. If wicked problems can be resolved and modified by administrative action alone,

(2003).

21.

Martin Nie, Drivers of Natural Resource-Based Political Conflict, 36 POL’Y SCI. 307, 307–08

22. McBeth et al., supra note 7, at 392.
23. See NATHAN, supra note 5.
24. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Emerging New Cooperative Federalism?, 45 PUBLIUS: J. FED. 452, 452–74 (2015); WILLIAM W. HOGAN, ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND THE CLEAN POWER
PLANT 9–23 (Sept. 21, 2015), https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/whogan/Hogan_CPP_092115.pdf.
25. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 40 C.F.R. §§ 60, 70, 71, 98 (2015); see also Jeremy M. Tarr, The Clean Air
Act and Power Sector Carbon Standards: Basics of Section 111(d), DUKE NICHOLAS INST. ENVTL. POL’Y SOLUTIONS
(Sept. 2013), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_pb_13-03.pdf; Jeremy
M. Tarr et al., Energy Efficiency and Greenhouse Gas Limits for Existing Power Plants: Learning from EPA
Precedent, DUKE NICHOLAS INST. ENVTL. POL’Y SOLUTIONS 3 (June 2013), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_r_13-04_0.pdf.
26. See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 40 C.F.R. § 60 (2017); Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations,
40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 52, 60 (2018).
27. Zack Colman, Trump’s Repeal Is Coming. Industry Is Watching the Clock, CLIMATEWIRE (Oct. 5,
2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060062681/search?keyword=mccabe (quoting Janet McCabe); see also Roger Pielke Jr., supra note 14; Cass R. Sunstein, There’s Little Confusion About
Trump’s Regulatory Record: There’s a Lot More Continuity Than You Might Think, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-06/trump-isn-t-wrecking-obama-s-regulation-legacy.
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then why not less wicked, even ordinary problems? 28 If administrative action is all
that is needed, what then is the role of elected officials and the non-elected bureaucracy in making and implementing public policy? A deeply divided public thus
finds itself on uncertain policy terrain with much at stake, while different administrations devise and dismantle regulations along party lines. Such actions frustrate
important policy deliberations, the poignancy of which is felt most when wicked
problems are involved. 29 Of course, climate policy is but one of many wicked problems subjected to whipsaw positions and unilateral regulatory actions. From foreign
conflicts to immigration, United States policy is replete with unstable positions that
seem to change with each election cycle. However, the handling of climate policy
through administrative rulemaking, which was crafted by one president only to be
dismantled by the next, provides an instructive window into a policy problem that
clearly highlights the rationalization of unilateral action through the administrative
presidency.
Importantly, the administrative actions of presidents, especially with respect
to wicked policy problems left unaddressed by affirmative congressional action,
pose serious questions about the proper role of the bureaucracy in America. As
originally conceived by Nathan, the administrative presidency relies heavily on the
belief that the president runs the bureaucracy and should utilize it to implement
policy preferences. 30 In times of political ossification, to modify a phrase from von
Clausewitz, 31 this often means administrative action is merely the continuation of
legislation by other means—that is, by presidential administrative action through
the bureaucracy. Of course, the appropriate extent of administrative action has long
been debated in public administration. A central aspect of the debate is the proper
role of the bureaucracy in making and shaping policy, especially where competing
values are in conflict and interest groups seek to influence the decision-making process. 32 One purpose of this study is to take a closer look at the administrative presidency’s use of the bureaucracy to shape policy on issues for which Congress either
lacks the appetite or ability to address.

28. In a sense all organized efforts, whether public or private, seek to command increasing influence over their various areas of interest. As influence expands so does control, and modern society is frequently defined by its controlling interests and an important question becomes who decides? See THEODORE
J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 22–41 (1979).
29. TULIS ET AL., supra note 6. Tulis argues that under the rhetorical presidency policy is subject to
frequent change and characterized by a lack of deliberation and “decay of political discourse.” When the
rhetorical presidency is used to address wicked problems, which are by nature values laden and divisive,
the public is subject to the divisive rhetoric but remains bereft of deliberation that facilitates resolution.
Instead, the public is subject to policy swings with each change of political wind. See also Bryan Garsten, The
Rhetoric Revival in Political Theory, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 159, 159–80 (2011).
30. NATHAN, supra note 5.
31. The original translation is “war is a mere continuation of policy by [with] other means.” See
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 121 (Colonel J.J. Graham trans., Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1908).
32. See, e.g., Carl J. Friedrich, Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility, in
PUBLIC POL’Y 3, 3–24 (C.J. Friedrich & E.S. Mason eds., 1940); Herman Finer, Administrative Responsibility in
Democratic Government, 1 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 335, 335–50 (1941); H. George Frederickson, Toward a New
Public Administration, in TOWARD A NEW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THE MINNOWBROOK PERSPECTIVE 309–31 (Frank
Marini ed., 1971); LOWI, supra note 28; Lewis, supra note 4, at 60–73.
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A primary contribution this article endeavors to make is in the bringing together of “administrative presidency” scholarship with “rhetorical presidency”
scholarship in analyzing the EPA and the Clean Power Plan. “Rhetorical presidency”
scholarship examines how presidents use rhetoric to not only engage the public but
also to define problems, set the agenda, propose solutions, and indirectly influence
political actors. 33 The term “rhetoric” is used in diverse ways by different scholars, 34
but for the purposes of this article, rhetoric is defined in the classical Aristotelian
tradition as understanding what is persuasive and using it to convince others under
a variety of circumstances. 35 Yet, the consequences of the rhetorical presidency,
especially as it is evolving today, extend beyond just the presidential use of rhetoric
to persuade.
According to Tulis, a president’s rhetoric concerns the “constitutional order”
and governance, and it is the vehicle by which contemporary presidents seek to
influence policy and govern the citizenry. 36 Governance in this sense is taken to
mean a “government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services,”
as well as where the locus of control lies for such services, whether at the local or
centrally controlled, federal level. 37 The rhetorical presidency thus describes the
willingness of presidents to bypass Congress and “mobilize the public as a routine
means of governance.” 38 Some scholars, such as Tulis, view this practice as destructive to American constitutional principles, 39 while others see its impact on democracy as ranging from unimportant, 40 to harmful. 41 Regardless of how scholars have
come to view it, the study of the rhetorical presidency indicates that it “is, at least
potentially, a potent force and a significant political resource that needs to be understood and used wisely.” 42 It is important to point out that the potentially potent
force of the rhetorical presidency described by Stuckey may very well be magnified
when combined with the administrative presidency, making the admonition to understand and use it wisely all the more compelling.
This study lies at the intersection of these three scholarly areas: the wicked
problem of climate change policy making; the administrative presidency; and the
33. See TULIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 3–23; see also Paul J. Quirk, When the President Speaks, How
Do the People Respond?, 19 CRITICAL REV. 427, 427–46 (2007).
34. See Garsten, supra note 29; see also David Fleming, Rhetoric as a Course of Study, 61 C. ENG.
169, 169–91 (1998).
35. Christof Rapp, Aristotle’s Rhetoric, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 4.1 (2010),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/#4.1.
36. See Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency in Retrospect, 19 CRITICAL REV. 481, 481–500
(2007).
37. Francis Fukuyama, What is Governance?, 26 GOVERNANCE 347, 347–68, Section Definitions
(2013).
38. MARY STUCKEY, RETHINKING THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY AND PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC, 10 REV. COMM.
38, 40 (2010).
39. See TULIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 145–72; Tulis, supra note 36, at 492–98.
40. GEORGE C. EDWARDS, ON DEAF EARS: THE LIMITS OF THE BULLY PULPIT (Yale Univ. Press eds., 2006);
see also David Zarefsky, Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition, 34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 607
(2004).
41. Roderick P. Hart, The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age
210–14 (Chicago: Univ. Press 1987); see Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Political Speechmaking (New York: Oxford University Press eds., 1988).
42. Stuckey, supra note 38.
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rhetorical presidency. Wicked environmental problems have garnered significant
attention from myriad policy scholars. 43 Climate change itself remains a subject of
substantial import in U.S. policy because of its high salience, entrenched views despite a well-documented scientific consensus, and elusive solutions. The administrative presidency has been extensively studied over the years by political scientists
and public policy and administration scholars. 44 And the rhetorical presidency has
been studied by communication scholars and political scientists over the past three
decades. 45 This proposed study aims to bring these different scholarly conversations together in order to draw some larger conclusions about the current state of
democratic decision-making. Ideally, the conclusions from this work will contribute
to themes of significant concern to public administration scholars, such as government accountability, responsibility, and democratic principles. 46
With Stuckey’s admonition in clear view—to better understand the “potentially potent force” and “significant political resource” that is the rhetorical presidency—this study begins by asking how President Obama rhetorically constructed
the role of the EPA, effectively weaponizing it to implement federal climate change
regulations? Importantly, the way in which presidents rationalize their use of the
administrative presidency may reveal an evolving view of the bureaucracy in implementing policy, including under what conditions strong executive action is justified
and whether there are any limits to such action. Such an analysis may also provide
insights into whether the administrative presidency is simply one tool of executive
power, or reflects more broadly on how presidents view the bureaucracy. With respect to this last point, as discussed in more detail later, I borrow from political
scientist Donald Kettl to construct a typology of how presidents view the control of
government and the role of bureaucracy within it. 47 While Kettl proposed a framework rather than a typology, his original theoretical contribution will help root the
analysis in historical perspectives of governance and provide a theoretical starting
point for expanding our understanding of both the presidency and bureaucracy. 48
43. See, e.g., Hank C. Jenkins-Smith et al., The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Foundations, Evolution, and Ongoing Research, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 183–224 (Paul A. Sabatier & Christopher M.
Weible eds., 2014); Mark K. McBeth et al., The Narrative Policy Framework, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS
225–66 (Paul A. Sabatier & Christopher M. Weible eds., 2014); Mathew C. Nisbet, Communicating Climate
Change: Why Frames Matter for Public Engagement, 51 ENVIRONMENT: SCIENCE AND POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 12 (2009); see also BRIDGET K. FAHEY, FRAMING A HOT ISSUE: PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE OF CLIMATE
CHANGE FROM 2006 TO 2012 AND THE INFLUENCE OF ISSUE FRAMING (Western Political Science Association, Panel
03.08 - Agenda Setting in Environmental Policy 2013).
44. Kagan, supra note 17; see also NATHAN, supra note 5; Moe, The Political Presidency, supra
note 5; Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J. L., ECON., & ORG.
132 (1999); Lewis, supra note 4; ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: RENEWING PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AFTER WATERGATE (2005); Kenneth S. Lowande & Sidney M. Milkis, “We Can’t Wait”: Barack Obama,
Partisan Polarization and The Administrative Presidency, 12 FORUM 3 (2014).
45. See MARTIN J. MEDHURST, THE PROSPECT OF PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC (2008); Lewis, supra note 4;
WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 13; KERNELL, supra note 16; TULIS ET AL., supra note 6; Tulis, supra note 36;
Stuckey, supra note 38; Stephen Skowronek, Presidency and American Political Development: A Third Look,
32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 743 (2002); EDWARDS, supra note 40.
46. LOWI, supra note 28; see also Moe & Howell, supra note 44; Lewis, supra note 4; Tulis, supra
note 36.
47. See Kettl, supra note 3.
48. Id.
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Ultimately, a better understanding of the “potentially potent force” of a “weaponized” bureaucracy and how presidents view it may help reveal new insights about
how the use of the bureaucracy to implement presidential policies affects democratic principles. 49 Notably, while rulemakings follow a rigorous review process
through the Administrative Procedures Act, using the bureaucracy in such a
weaponized manner creates a mismatch between the seriousness of the policy
problem and fickleness of the policy response. Such a mismatch may undermine a
more appropriately deliberative response and foster policies that are driven and
resolved by populist appeal, as will be discussed later in the article.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this Part, the article first addresses the concept of climate change as a
wicked problem in the public policy space and how climate change acts as a marker
of political ideology. The article then sets forth a theoretical framework that will
help orient historical ways in which the presidency and bureaucracy have been
viewed in the scholarly literature. The theoretical framework will be followed by a
more detailed discussion about presidential control and the two elements of control—the administrative presidency and rhetorical presidency—that are the focus
of this article.
A. Wicked Problems and Presidential Control
In terms of sheer wickedness, there is perhaps no more wicked problem in
America than climate change policy. Indeed, climate change is unique in both its
breadth of impact and depth of discord, joining gun control, taxation, immigration,
and abortion in the way it hardens the partisan divide and “defines what it means
to be a Republican or Democrat.” 50 Thus, the wicked problem of climate change is
among a handful of issues that are acutely steeped in partisan politics, where presidential rhetoric sets the tone for how partisans, and opponents, view the problem. 51 Combined with the way in which the underlying contributors of anthropogenic climate change are embedded in the institutions, infrastructure, and economy
of the U.S., such characteristics make climate change policy ripe for presidential influence and, therefore, an ideal backdrop for studying the administrative and rhetorical presidency.
The way in which climate change is defined and framed as a policy problem
also contributes to its utility as a focus of the study. For example, who defines the
problem has important implications as well. As noted by Sarah Pralle, issue salience

49. The term “weaponized” is intended to be politically neutral. In this context, it is simply a
description of how the EPA is utilized to address climate change policy that had previously failed in Congress
and would have been sidelined but for executive action via an administrative agency. When considering a
similar use of the EPA by a subsequent presidency to address the same policy issue but in the opposite
direction, the term becomes even more apt.
50. Matthew C. Nisbet, Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter for Public Engagement, 51 ENV’T: SCI. POL’Y SUSTAINABLE DEV. 12, 14 (2009).
51. Zarefsky, supra note 40.
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waxes and wanes with how a problem is defined. 52 Issues that are defined as immediate, catastrophic, and proximate will find a higher place on the public and governmental agenda than issues that are defined as uncertain, economically expensive, socially undesirable, or occurring in the distant future. 53 Not coincidentally,
this is a dividing line in the climate change debate, which is often characterized, on
one hand, as the “defining issue of our time” or, on the other, as a “hoax” that is
too expensive and too uncertain to worry about. 54 This dynamic creates positive
and negative feedback loops, and when combined with crises, or focusing events,
can lead to either long periods of equilibrium as the status quo is maintained or
punctuated moments of dramatic change. 55 Arguably, climate change policy has experienced high degrees of both positive and negative feedback loops, yet with little
change.
One reason for this, as Nisbet argues, is revealed in recent polling on climate
change views that reflect a deep polarization of opinions, “resulting in two Americas
divided along ideological lines.” 56 The divide breaks along predictably political lines,
with Republicans increasingly questioning the certainty of the science of climate
change and urgency of its effects, while Democrats increasingly endorse climate
science findings and react with growing concern about possible deleterious effects
on the environment and society. 57 Notably, the partisan divide is unaffected by education or knowledge. 58 Roser-Renouf, et al., find that Americans hold a slightly
more diverse, albeit similarly divided view, of global warming, resulting in six discrete groups they refer to as “Global Warming’s Six Americas.” 59 However, despite
a more refined parsing of views on global warming, their data reflects a similar
break along the same ideological lines described by Nisbet. 60 Thus, when considering climate change, whether one sees two or six Americas, the conclusion is the
same: climate change is characterized by deeply divided and firmly held ideological
views, making it among the most wicked of not only environmental problems but
social problems as well. It also makes it susceptible to the influences of the party in
control of the bureaucracy.

52.
53.

See Sarah B. Pralle, Agenda-Setting and Climate Change, 18 ENV’TL. POL. 781, 785–91 (2009).
See id.; KAREN T. LITFIN, OZONE DISCOURSE: SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION (1995); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS (1998).
54. The statement “the defining issue of our time” was used in reference to climate change in
the February 26, 2014 report jointly issued by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Royal
Society in the United Kingdom, which sought to provide a clearly written reference document for policy
makers, educators, and others about the current state of climate change science. Senator James Inhofe
stated in July 28, 2003 speech on the Senate floor that “catastrophic global warming is a hoax” and went on
to highlight the expense of climate change mitigation and inherent uncertainties of climate change science.
See 149 CONG. REC. S10021 (July 28, 2003).
55. BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 14, at 3–24.
56. Nisbet, supra note 50, at 14.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See CONNIE ROSER-RENOUF ET AL., GLOBAL WARMING’S SIX AMERICAS IN OCTOBER 2014: PERCEPTIONS
OF THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBAL WARMING AND UPDATE ON KEY BELIEFS 6–8 (2014), http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Six-Americas-October-2014.pdf.
60. See Nisbet, supra note 50, at 14.
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B. Mapping Presidential Control
In order to understand how presidents view their authority and the role of
bureaucracy, it is helpful to place the various views on the matter in historical context. Notably, political control of the bureaucracy is the quintessential element underlying the politics-administration dichotomy. 61 While this study does not focus on
the dichotomy per se, the familiar refrain of its principal arguments certainly echoes
in the background. From a normative standpoint, an important question is how active executives should be in directing administrative agencies to shape public policy,
especially where Congress has not specifically acted to fill a policy void by statute
or clarified the implementation standards of how more ambiguous statutes should
be implemented. In other words, what role should administrative agencies play
when there is both a legal and policy vacuum? And since presidents direct the actions of agencies, how proactive should executives be in filling the void of congressional inaction? Perhaps a more fundamental question is how do presidents themselves view their use of presidential control? How one views presidential control
goes a long way in answering these questions and whether value-laden, polarized,
and unsettled policy problems, like climate change, should be addressed through
administrative action rather than through a deliberative, congressional process. Another important consideration is the sense of urgency, and even opportunity, motivated by values, priorities, and politics, presidents feel when Congress leaves a
void that creates space out of which policies can be adopted through administrative
action. Such occasions grant executives freedom to pursue policies that are controversial and unsettled (i.e. wicked in nature), albeit not without legal, congressional,
and political challenges. After all, wicked problems like climate change remain
wicked because of the vigor with which policies addressing them are promoted, defended, and opposed. 62 At the same time, presidents will utilize policy voids to pursue their own political and policy ends.
For example, scholars have long noted, some more approvingly than others,
that administrative actions via the bureaucracy, as well as the independent actions
of administrators themselves, are a means to social, economic, and political ends

61. The roots of the bureaucracy-democracy tension extend to Woodrow Wilson and his articulation of the politics-administration dichotomy. In its most basic construction, the politics-administration
dichotomy argues for a distinction between politics and administration. Views in favor of a dichotomy during the Progressive Era were motivated by the belief that a better practice of public administration, one that
was separated from the influence of politics, would lead to better outcomes. Thus, government could be
improved to the extent its career bureaucrats were insulated from “political meddling.” See Kettl, supra
note 3, at 7, 9. As Wilson asserted, “[A]dministration lies outside the proper sphere of politics…. [a]lthough
politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices.” See Woodrow
Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 210 (1887). For historic representations and helpful
modern discussions of the politics-administration dichotomy, see also THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION: SCOPE, OBJECTIVES, AND METHODS (James C. Charlesworth ed., 1968); Nicholas Henry, Paradigms of Public Administration, 35 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 378, 378–86 (1975); LEONARD DUPEE WHITE, INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1926); FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN
GOVERNMENT (2017); JAMES P. PFIFFNER, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 57, 57–65 (1967); KENNETH J. MEIER & LAURENCE J.
O’TOOLE, JR., BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRATIC STATE: A GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 21–23 (2006).
62. Nisbet, supra note 50, at 18–20.
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that may or may not reflect broader and more diverse public values. 63 As such, it
matters greatly who does the influencing and how it occurs. As noted by Lewis, using the bureaucracy to achieve political ends is frequently a factor of either agency
capture or the influence of interest groups, neither of which tend to be broadly
representative of the public interest. 64 In a similar vein, Lowi describes how the influence of special interest groups leads to “the atrophy of institutions of popular
control,” 65 which describes what happens when policy becomes untethered from
“clear standards of implementation,” leaving the priorities of institutions to those
with the greatest influence over them. 66 The same principle holds true for the executive office. Even though the president is formally in control of executive agencies, his views are not necessarily representative of even a majority of the populace. 67 Therefore, whether presidents or special interests control the bureaucracy,
narrowly defined priorities may frustrate the realization of broader social values.
These insights are helpful in better understanding the criticism associated
with unilateral administrative actions that deviate from clear legislative priorities
and requirements. However, as noted above, legislation is rarely so clear or prescriptive, especially where wicked problems are concerned, leaving executives and
administrative agencies to set policies or to sort out Congress’s intent through administrative rulemaking. 68 Naturally, such actions are not universally welcome. And
one clearly observable result has been an expansion of litigation surrounding
agency rulemaking and priorities. 69
The Clean Power Plan is representative of such a dynamic, as it has been in
litigation since the Obama Administration EPA’s final order implementing it in
2015. 70 If the Trump Administration EPA is successful in rescinding and replacing
the Clean Power Plan, the regulatory landscape will change but the prevalence of
litigation will not, since those favoring stronger CO2 regulation will subsequently sue
EPA for weakening it. As this dynamic plays out, EPA’s interpretation of the relevant
statute and views of its own interpretive discretion, while appearing schizophrenic,
are merely symptomatic of the climate change policy void coupled with strikingly
divergent policies of the Obama and Trump administrations. 71 In the light of expanding litigation regarding agency rulemaking, numerous scholars have observed
63. See, e.g., Frederickson, supra note 32, at 309–10; LOWI, supra note 28, at 23–24.
64. Lewis, supra note 4, at 9–10.
65. LOWI, supra note 28, at 58.
66. Id. at 298; see also James Q. Wilson, Juridical Democracy versus American Democracy, 23 PS:
POL. SCI. AND POL. 570, 570–72 (1990) [hereinafter Wilson, Juridical Democracy]; JAMES Q. WILSON,
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1991) [hereinafter WILSON, BUREAUCRACY].
67. Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 373–90 (2010).
68. Wilson, Juridical Democracy, supra note 66.
69. David B. Spence, Agency Discretion and the Dynamics of Procedural Reform, 59 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 425, 426 (1999).
70. See Clean Power Plan Case Resources, ENVT’L. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/climate/cleanpower-plan-case-resources (last visited Mar. 23, 2019) (“Opponents of the Clean Power Plan have been
suing since before the rule was even finalized in August 2015”).
71. See, e.g., Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,036–39 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (proposing to repeal the Clean Power Plan in its entirety in accordance with Executive Order
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that administrative agencies have become “gun-shy and produced an ‘ossified’
agency decision-making process that is less flexible, less rational, and less effective.” 72 It is likely this predicament is in some fashion exacerbated by presidential
control over agency agendas, priorities, and even the rules they promulgate, leading to more constrained agency action. Some scholars would argue this outcome
speaks to the need for enhanced agency discretion to more fully represent societal
values and mitigate negative, or unforeseen, consequences of implemented policies, 73 while others would argue for clearer legislation to limit agency discretion,
not to mention presidential control. 74
Regardless of the merits of either view of bureaucratic discretion, the fact remains that agencies, as well as presidents, frequently interpret congressional intent. 75 Of course, there is typically ample room for interpretation, since it is virtually
impossible to draft legislation that contemplates all possible future conditions. This
is particularly true when technology, goals, implementation, future conditions, and
overlapping tasks (first described as polycentric tasks by philosopher Michael Polanyi) 76 cannot be defined, let alone identified, upfront. 77 This legislative ambiguity
may even allow, if not invite, executive action to fill the void, or at least shape it to
fit their policy preferences. 78 Given the prominent role presidents play in this regard, it is helpful to contextualize how they have done so historically. Here, Kettl is
helpful in sorting out the main ways in which presidents have approached governance, in particular the way in which they view the bureaucracy as a means for promoting policies.
Although Kettl developed his framework as a way of categorizing the main
academic and practitioner views on “administrative ideas and political philosophy”
(i.e. the politics-administration dichotomy), it also functions well as a typology of
presidential approaches to the question of the role of bureaucracy. 79 As shown in
Figure 1, the first type is the Madisonian tradition, which maintains that governance

13783, “Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth,” and the EPA’s updated interpretation
finding the Obama Administration EPA exceeded the agency's statutory authority under section 111(d) of
the Clean Air Act).
72. Spence, supra note 69, at 426; see also MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF
THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 162–91 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1st ed. 1980); Thomas O. McGarity, Some
Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L. J. 1385, 1386–87 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 955–1026 (1995).
73. Frederickson, supra note 32, at 328–30; Friedrich, supra note 32.
74. Finer, supra note 32; LOWI, supra note 28.
75. Wilson, Juridical Democracy, supra note 66.
76. See MICHAEL POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY 147 (1951). For a good general discussion on the
topic, see also Paul D. Aligica & Vlad Tarko, Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond, 25
GOVERNANCE 237 (2012).
77. Wilson, Juridical Democracy, supra note 66; see also Lon L. Fuller & Kenneth I. Winston, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
78. Moe & Howell, supra note 44.
79. Kettl, supra note 3, at 14.
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is predicated on political power as opposed to administrative efficiency. 80 As described by Kettl, the Madisonian view is “rich . . . in balance-of-power politics,”
where politics is very much a part of administration. 81
Wilsonian
(Hierarchical)

Madisonian
(Balance of Power)

Hamiltonian
(Strong-Executive/
Top-Down)

Strong-executive
Top-down accountability
Hierarchical authority

Centered on non-bureaucratic
institutions
Focus on political power
Top-down accountability

Jeffersonian
(Weak-Executive/
Bottom-Up)

Weak-executive
Bottom-up responsibility
Responsive to citizens

Centered on non-bureaucratic
institutions
Focus on local control
Bottom-up responsiveness

Figure 1. Typology of Presidential Control in the U.S. 82
The second type is in the Hamiltonian tradition, which is best characterized by
the Federalist Alexander Hamilton, who argued that “energy in the executive is a
leading character of the definition of good government.” 83 In other words, Hamiltonians are characterized by a strong executive branch actively seeking to serve the
public interest but “held in check by popular institutions.” 84 The third type rests in
the Jeffersonian tradition, which is characterized by the preservation of individual
autonomy through grassroots, bottom-up governance that is limited in scope and
power, and situated at the lowest possible level of government. 85 In the Jeffersonian tradition, the bureaucracy, if there is any at all, should be as small as possible.
Finally, no typology of public administration would be complete without the Wilsonian tradition. The Wilsonian tradition adheres to the politics-administration dichotomy and is characterized by a competent and professional bureaucracy separated from the influence of politics. 86 In other words, Wilsonians believe in an accountable, technically capable bureaucracy unencumbered by politics and nonthreatening to democracy. 87
To summarize Kettl’s theoretical framework, then, the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian types are contrasted with one another and capture views of government
hierarchy. Thus, the Hamiltonian type represents a “strong-executive/top-down”
construct, while the Jeffersonian type represents a “weak executive/bottom-up”
80.
81.

Kettl, supra note 3, at 17.
Kettl, supra note 3, at 15. See generally JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON B. WILDAVSKY,
IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND (1973); WILSON, BUREAUCRACY,
supra note 66; John M. Gaus, Trends in the Theory of Public Administration, 10 Pub. Admin. Rev. 161 (1950).
82. Kettl, supra note 3, at 17.
83. Id. at 15.
84. Id. at 16.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see also Wilson, supra note 61.
87. Kettl, supra note 3, at 16–17.
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construct. The Wilsonian and Madisonian types are contrasted with one another
and capture the way in which the bureaucracy is viewed respectively as “hierarchy,
authority, process, and structure” versus “political balance-of-power.” 88 Because
the typology represents the dominant ideas in public administration and governance since the late nineteenth century, 89 it provides a useful way to begin assessing
how Obama views the respective roles of government and the bureaucracy and, as
I discuss below, may be used to inform the coding of presidential statements.
Notably, the role of the bureaucracy in making and shaping policy is a central
aspect highlighted by the typology, and it is important to keep in mind that the typology is more than a mere abstraction. On the contrary, each type represents a
dominant theme in the history of American public administration and governance.
Which theme is the most appropriate depends on ideological views of the role of
government as well as more pragmatic views of who’s in charge of it. Thus, it may
be that ideological purity fades into the shadow of expediency. Ultimately, as described by Kettl referencing an argument made by John Gaus, “how one feels about
power depends on whether one has it.” 90 To apply the same sentiment to this study,
how one feels about administrative action depends on which administration is acting and how such actions are rationalized through presidential rhetoric, making
both the administrative and rhetorical presidency important concepts for further
analysis.
C. Zeroing in on the Administrative and Rhetorical Presidencies
In this Part, the article looks more closely at the administrative and rhetorical
aspects of presidential control and more precisely delineates their application by
various presidents. While the two aspects of control are frequently exercised somewhat independently of one another, their joint use is particularly noteworthy when
presidential priorities meet congressional resistance. However, regardless of the
level of resistance to policies, occupants have, without exception, entered the Oval
Office intent on advancing their favored policies. 91 To that end, presidents have
framed and promoted issues through campaign speeches, press conferences, inaugural and State of the Union addresses, and now through the social media venue of
Twitter. 92 By doing so, each president has played an important role in signaling policy intentions. In the environmental policy arena, there arguably was no president
more actively engaged in promoting environmental policies than Teddy Roosevelt,

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 16; see also JOHN M. GAUS, REFLECTIONS ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 135 (2006).
Norman J. Vig, The American Presidency and Environmental Policy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Michael E. Kraft & Sheldon Kamieniecki eds., 2012) [hereinafter Vig, The American Presidency].
92. Id. See generally Brian L. Ott, The Age of Twitter: Donald J. Trump and the Politics of Debasement, 34 CRITICAL STUD. IN MEDIA COMM. 59 (2016).
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who put the power and energy of the president fully behind the conservation movement through his rhetoric and actions. 93 Indeed, according to historian Paul Cutright, meaningful strides in the conservation movement were achieved only after
Roosevelt applied his presidential heft to what he saw as a moral, even religious,
response to the mismanagement of natural resources. 94 In more recent times, presidents have framed issues and employed their powers to both expand and restrict
environmental regulations, sometimes with the help of Congress but often on their
own. 95 Thus, presidents have played an integral role by word and deed in shaping
and implementing polices since the inception of the environmental movement and
will continue to do so in the climate change era as well.
To illustrate the point, in the modern era, presidents Richard Nixon, Jimmy
Carter, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama used the executive office
to advance environmental protections, in such diverse areas as the establishment
of the EPA, energy conservation, acid rain, environmental justice, and greenhouse
gas reductions. 96 On the other hand, presidents Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan,
George W. Bush, and Donald Trump have used the same office to blunt or even
reverse the actions of prior presidents, punctuated by Reagan’s and Trump’s deregulatory activities. 97 The effort of presidents in this regard has attracted the attention of scholars interested in both environmental policy and presidential studies,
although not commonly at the intersection of the two. 98 Scholars also have devoted
considerable effort studying environmental policy disputes, with their highly politicized and polarized nature, conflicting values, and intractable positions. 99
As noted, such problems also are prone to rhetorical influences. While not a
topic of this study, it bears mentioning that because of the importance of the president in agenda setting, presidential rhetoric plays a prominent role in framing
wicked problems. This is particularly important because the U.S. legislative system
tends to reinforce the status quo, and implementing policy solutions requires the
93. Vig, The American Presidency, supra note 91, at 306–08. See generally PAUL RUSSELL CUTRIGHT,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT: THE MAKING OF A CONSERVATIONIST (1985); Leroy G. Dorsey, Preaching Conservation: Theodore Roosevelt and the Rhetoric of Civil Religion, in GREEN TALK IN THE WHITE HOUSE: THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY
ENCOUNTERS ECOLOGY 37 (Tarla Rai Peterson ed., 2004).
94. Dorsey, supra note 93, at 38.
95. See Vig, The American Presidency, supra note 91; Norman J. Vig, Presidential Powers and
Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 80–98 (Norman
J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 9th ed. 2016) [hereinafter Vig, Presidential Powers]; Michael E. Kraft, Environmental Policy in Congress: From Consensus to Gridlock, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 127 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2016).
96. Vig, The American Presidency, supra note 91, at 306–28; Michael E. Kraft & Norman J. Vig,
Environmental Policy from the 1970s to the Twenty-First Century, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 13–20 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2016).
97. Vig, The American Presidency, supra note 91, at 306–28; see also JUDITH A. LAYZER, OPEN FOR
BUSINESS: CONSERVATIVES’ OPPOSITION TO ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 41–49, 83–133 (2012).
98. Vig, The American Presidency, supra note 9191, at 324; see also Terry M. Moe, The Revolution
in Presidential Studies, PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 701, 701–24 (2009) [hereinafter Moe, Revolution in Presidential
Studies].
99. See, e.g., LESLIE R. ALM ET AL., TURMOIL IN AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY: SCIENCE DEMOCRACY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2010); Jasanoff, supra note 53; Litfin, supra note 53; Jenkins-Smith ET AL., supra note 43; BRUCE
A. WILLIAMS & ALBERT R. MATHENY, DEMOCRACY, DIALOGUE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES (1995).
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aid of focusing events, policy entrepreneurs, executive action, or all the above. 100
Such is the context for climate policy and legislative action intended to mitigate
harmful impacts attributed to a warming planet. Consequently, future policies to
address such impacts, or maintain the status quo of not addressing them, are influenced and rationalized by the rhetorical presidency and the way in which problems
and solutions are framed.
Therefore, unilateral presidential action remains prominently at the heart of
making and shaping environmental policy. 101 For example, from 1970 to 1990 in a
unique act of bi-partisan cooperation on environmental policy, Congress passed
nearly every prominent environmental law on which today’s regulations are
based. 102 Since the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, however,
Congress has had extremely limited success in enacting or amending any nationally
significant environmental laws, making the unilateral, administrative action of the
president one of the primary means of implementing environmental reform and
advancing new policies. 103 While some scholars, such as Richard Neustadt and John
Burke, have pointed out that the fragmented, polarized, and systemic structural
constraints in the U.S. political system contributes to a weak executive office, presidential studies—especially recent studies—point to growing presidential powers
through executive management of the bureaucracy and an increasing willingness to
rely on such power rather than an uncertain legislative process. 104 This primarily has
taken the form of centralizing power in the White House and politicizing the bureaucracy to circumvent an uncertain, and sometimes hostile, legislative process by
attempting to control policy outcomes through administrative action. 105 According
to Vig, scholars have thus focused presidential studies “increasingly on the rational
exercise of administrative powers, especially during periods of divided government,
gridlock in Congress, and national emergency.” 106 Of course, seeking to influence
outcomes and direct policy through the bureaucracy gets at the heart of the administrative presidency, a subject to which this article now turns in more depth.

100. See generally BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 14; Thomas A. Birkland, Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting 18 J. PUB. POL’Y 53 (1998); JOHN KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC
CHOICES (1984); Litfin, supra note 53; Tora Skodvin & Steinar Anderson, An Agenda for Change in US Climate
Policies? Presidential Ambitions and Congressional Powers, 9 INT’L ENVT’L AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 263
(2009). For a description of the policy process that is more dynamic and interpretive, yet leading to similar
conclusions, see DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 248–68 (3d. ed. 2002).
101. Vig, The American Presidency, supra note 91, at 306–08.
102. Id.
103. Kraft & Vig, supra note 96; Vig, The American Presidency, supra note 91, at 306–08.
104. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP
FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (Free Press 1990); John P. Burke, Organizational Structure and Presidential Decision Making, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 501–27 (G. C. Edwards III et al. eds., 2009); Vig,
The American Presidency, supra note 91; Barry Rabe, Environmental Policy and the Bush Era: The Collision
Between the Administrative Presidency and State Experimentation, 37 PUBLIUS: J. FED. 413 (2007); Lowande
& Milkis, supra note 44.
105. Moe, The Political Presidency, supra note 4; Vig, Presidential Powers, supra note 95, at 80–
98; Vig, The American Presidency, supra note 91.
106. Vig, The American Presidency, supra note 91, at 308; see also, Moe, The Political Presidency,
supra note 4; Lewis, supra note 4; Moe & Howell, supra note 44; Waterman, supra note 4.
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D. Describing the Administrative Presidency
As described by Kagan, writing prior to her Supreme Court appointment,
“[t]he history of the American administrative state is the history of competition
among different entities for control of its policies.” 107 These entities include the
president, Congress, and the courts, all of which possess potent constitutional powers that make it unlikely that any single entity will emerge ultimately triumphant,
although at various points in history each seems to hold sway on important policy
matters. 108 According to Kagan and other scholars, the rise of the administrative
presidency since the 1970s means the executive office currently enjoys a more
dominant policymaking position than either Congress or the courts. 109 In fact, since
the initial expansion of presidential powers under President Nixon, executive influence over administrative agencies has increased with each subsequent presidency,
leading to increasingly greater influence over policy matters either unilaterally or
by directing agency activities. 110 In addition to the gridlock and divided government
noted above, scholars have observed that the ongoing shift is due to a number of
factors, including a deeply divided electorate, an inordinate focus on re-election,
and Polanyi’s polycentric circles resulting from an increasingly complex political and
bureaucratic system. 111
In the light of such factors, the expansion of the administrative presidency is
understandable, especially since presidential success is often defined by presidential competence in implementing policies. 112 Presidents also are concerned with
their legacies. They want to be “regarded in the eyes of history as strong and effective leaders” and, in order to succeed, they must exert administrative control over
policies and priorities to achieve desired outcomes. 113 As noted by a number of
scholars, such demands are overwhelming and actually surpass the power of the
executive office to realize presidential goals, thus, incentivizing the expansion and
exertion of power and control over agencies. 114 However, while the rise of administrative presidencies in this context is perhaps predictable, it has neither come easily nor without controversy.
From the beginning, presidents have endeavored to shape and control the
outcomes of administrative agencies. 115 Not surprisingly, such endeavors have historically been difficult to accomplish. Presidents through the decades have frequently commented on the difficulty of prompting a recalcitrant bureaucracy to implement presidential will or a resistant Congress to consider policy solutions. In
speaking of the difficulty of controlling agencies, President Harry Truman is quoted
107. Kagan, supra note 17, at 2246.
108. Id.
109. Id.; Moe & Howell, supra note 44.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, Mandates or Mandarins? Control and Discretion in the Modern Administrative State, 48 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 606 (1988).
112. Kagan, supra note 17.
113. Moe & Howell, supra note 44, at 136.
114. Moe & Howell, supra note 44, at 158–59; THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER
INVESTED, POWER UNFULFILLED (1985).
115. Kagan, supra note 17, at 344-45.
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as exclaiming, "I thought I was the president, but when it comes to these bureaucrats, I can't do a damn thing." 116 Similarly, President John F. Kennedy is said to have
once remarked about a request for administrative action, "I agree with you, but I
don't know if the government will." 117 Similar quotes can be added for Carter,
Reagan, and others. 118 Of course, it is not just the bureaucracy that sometimes frustrates presidents. With respect to legislation, one recent example occurred during
President Obama’s last term, when he eschewed an uncooperative Congress in favor of executive action predicated on a “We Can’t Wait” policy. 119 Again, this mindset is neither novel nor uncommon—it extends back to Theodore Roosevelt, who
argued that presidents have the duty, unless explicitly prohibited by the Constitution, to take whatever steps necessary to promote the nation’s interest. 120
While presidents have justified their exercise of power, expansion of executive control has largely occurred at the expense of legislative control. 121 Yet, Congress has done little in reaction, despite the many substantive changes enacted by
presidents in addition to “merely” clarifying policies and priorities. 122 As Nathan and
others argue, the expanding administrative presidency highlights the tension in the
traditional public administration model of a distinction between politics and administration. 123 Notably, after four years in office, Nixon favored the view that the president, as the chief executive, should employ a more managerial approach to agency
action, undercutting the Wilsonian view of an administration free from the influence of politics. 124 In writing about the administrative presidency, Nathan agrees
and argues, "[t]he basic premise is that management tasks can and should be performed by partisans. This concept is not only appropriate, but necessary, to a functioning democracy in a large and technologically advanced nation such as the
United States.” 125 For those who hold this view, it is not a question of whether a
president should intervene in administrative agencies, it is rather a question of how,
how much, and to what end. 126
In this light, it is interesting to note that ever since its inception, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) purportedly has either been captured by industry
116. Id. at 2272.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 2273-75.
119. Lowande & Milkis, supra note 44, at 5-6.
120. Moe & Howell, supra note 44, at 157. In employing his “stewardship theory” Roosevelt observed, “Under this interpretation of executive power I did and caused to be done many things not previously done by the president and the heads of departments. I did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden
the use of executive power.” Id.
121. Alfred C. Aman Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress Deregulatory Change and the
Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1106 (1988).
122. Id. at 1236. See also A. Rudalevige, Old Laws, New Meanings: Obama's Brand of Presidential
Imperialism, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2016).
123. NATHAN, supra note 5, at 41-42; James H. Svara, Complementarity of Politics and Administration as a Legitimate Alternative to the Dichotomy Model, 30 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 676, 676–705 (Jan. 1999).
124. NATHAN, supra note 5, at 7; see also Kettl, supra note 3, at 16-17; see also NORMA M. RICCUCCI,
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: TRADITIONS OF INQUIRY AND PHILOSOPHIES OF KNOWLEDGE 74 (2010); see generally Wilson,
supra note 61.
125. NATHAN, supra note 5, at 7; Presidential Leadership and Administrative Coordination: Examining the Theory of a Unified Executive, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 433, 436 (2006).
126. Michael E. Kraft & Norman J. Vig, Environmental Policy in the Reagan Presidency, 99 POL. SCI.
Q. 415, 422 (1984).
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or colluded with environmental activists, depending on which party occupies the
Oval Office. 127 Regardless of the veracity of such claims, the view that the EPA is
weaponized to achieve policy goals reflects the common understanding that natural
resource agencies in general and the EPA in particular are subject to the policy priorities of whichever presidential administration is in power. 128 As Durant argues,
there is a longstanding practice of using administrative mechanisms for policy implementation by other means as a way for presidents to achieve policy goals in the
face of recalcitrant political adversaries. 129 By way of example, Durant highlights the
greening of the government (a frame) during the Clinton Administration through
executive orders and government-wide administrative reform. 130 The Obama and
Trump administrations have taken similar approaches in recent times, albeit from
different perspectives on the role of government. Perhaps not coincidentally, then,
presidents Clinton, Obama, and now Trump have employed similar administrative
tactics after multiple-term presidencies of the opposite party. In the cases of Obama
and Clinton, the environmental agencies emerged from eight and twelve years, respectively, of significant pressure to limit or constrict environmental regulatory activity. 131 With new administrations and new priorities more aligned with environmental agency missions, administrative mechanisms became an expedient way of
implementing previously neglected regulations and policies, especially in the absence of bipartisan cooperation. 132
In practice, then, the administrative presidency cuts both ways across the political spectrum and is a common tool among modern presidents. Indeed, history
has shown and scholars have noted that every modern president since Nixon has
employed any means necessary to advance his policy goals. 133 The relevant point
being that where roadblocks exist, administrative presidencies will find a way
around. In fact, as already mentioned, legal ambiguity may even allow, if not altogether invite, executive action to fill the void. As a result, administrative presidencies play an active role in establishing values and priorities, especially when there is
127. Joel A. Mintz, Has Industry Captured the EPA?: Appraising Marver Bernstein’s Captive Agency
Theory After Fifty Years, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005); Ben Tyson, An Empirical Analysis of Sue-andSettle in Environmental Litigation, 100 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1569–77 (2014). For example, during the Obama
Administration, the U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (EPW) conducted oversight
on the role of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and other environmental groups, in what the
EPW majority staff concluded was an improper influence of “policy options, technical support, legal rationale, and public relations campaign” for the CPP. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS, 114th CONG.,
OBAMA’S CARBON MANDATE: AN ACCOUNT OF COLLUSION, CUTTING CORNERS, AND COSTING AMERICANS BILLIONS 2 (Aug.
2015).
128. See generally Vig, Presidential Powers and Environmental Policy, supra note 95; Vig, The
American Presidency, supra note 91.
129. Robert Durant, Back to the Future? Toward Revitalizing the Study of the Administrative Presidency, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 89, 93 (2009).
130. Id. at 95–96.
131. See generally LAYZER, supra note 97. See generally Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2007).
132. Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L. J. 1015, 1026 (2001); see also Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 131, at 108.
133. See Kagan, supra note 17, at 2275-76; see also Kraft & Vig, supra note 126, at 416-17; Lewis,
supra note 4; see generally Lowande & Milkis, supra note 44; NATHAN, supra note 5; Vig, The American Presidency, supra note 95; LAYZER, supra note 97.

178

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 55

no clear direction from Congress, or at times of deep political divide when legislatively addressing an existing void is impossible. 134 However, presidents do not just
act, they rather mobilize the public and set the governmental agenda by signaling
their intentions to act through formal and informal proclamations through the rhetorical presidency. 135 In so doing, presidents are able to embark on a process of
policy change through the rhetorical presidency, whereby they bypass Congress in
pursuit of political ends. 136 As discussed in the following Part, the rhetorical presidency covers the bully pulpit of the executive office. However, the rhetorical presidency is more than just arousing sentiment, setting the agenda, and signaling priorities; it is also mobilizing public support in an effort to displace the less certain,
less expeditious, and more methodical process of congressional deliberation.
E. Describing the Rhetorical Presidency
As originally conceived by Tulis, the rhetorical presidency encompasses the
way in which presidents use rhetoric to bypass Congress and engage the public to
define problems, set the agenda, propose solutions, and indirectly influence political actors. 137 Yet, the rhetorical presidency is much more than just the presidential
use of rhetoric to persuade; it concerns the “constitutional order” and governance,
and it is the vehicle by which contemporary presidents seek to influence policy and
govern the citizenry. 138 At its most basic level, it describes the willingness of presidents to bypass Congress and “mobilize the public as a routine means of governance.” 139
While Tulis’s work formally marks the beginning of the rhetorical presidency
as a branch of study, Neustadt’s seminal and influential study, Presidential Power,
is an important beginning point for presidential studies in general. As Skowronek
points out, the aspirations of the progressive era to create a government with the
president at the center was complicated by the institutional barriers against sweeping reform. 140 Neustadt describes the resulting environment as one where presidents are limited by a constitutional system designed to allow incremental change
but frustrate sweeping reform. 141 Because of this, according to Neustadt, presidents must rely on their personal skills and become adept at bargaining and persuasion to successfully meet the often-overinflated public expectations of the office. 142 Echoing Moe’s criticism of Neustadt’s approach, Tulis argues that viewing
the presidency from the president’s perspective ignores more prevailing institutional factors. Indeed, viewing the presidency “from over the President's shoulder,”

134. See generally TULIS ET AL., supra note 6.
135. Id. See generally Dorsey, supra note 93; Martin Carcasson, Global Gridlock: The American
Presidency and the Framing of International Environmentalism, 1988-2000, in GREEN TALK IN THE WHITE HOUSE:
THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY ENCOUNTERS ECOLOGY 258 (Tarla Rai Peterson ed., 2004).
136. TULIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 3–13.
137. Id.; see also Quirk, supra note 33, at 441–42; see generally Whitford & Yates, supra note 13.
138. Whitford & Yates, supra note 13, at 27–32.
139. Stuckey, supra note 38, at 43.
140. Skowronek, supra note 45, at 744–45.
141. NEUSTADT, supra note 104.
142. Id.
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as Neustadt does, creates an impression of an institutionally weak executive office. 143 However, presidential studies indicate increasing presidential powers and
the liberty with which presidents wield them. 144
With this in mind, Skowronek observes that Tulis identifies a trend by modern
presidents to become policy activists as they “attempt to displace the original constitutional structures that had supported the politics of the past.” 145 Under the original constitutional order of governance, as Tulis argues, the U.S. Constitution proscribed demagoguery, or popular leadership, and favored deliberation among the
elected representatives of the people. 146 The modern presidency, on the other
hand, ushered in by the Progressive leadership of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, placed more energy in the executive by prescribing popular appeals to
the public, marking the beginning of a “second constitution” under which presidents now govern. 147 The effect of the transaction is that presidential appeals to
the public subvert the original constitutional order, which leads to a decline in policy
deliberation and ascension of demagoguery. 148
In addressing the state of deliberation, Kernell observes that presidential rhetoric, by way of “going public” as a policy strategy, has a destabilizing effect on deliberative processes—that is, traditional pluralistic bargaining processes are discarded in favor of insular and unilateral decision making. 149 The result of this political exchange means policy is made and rationalized by public opinion. 150 Scholars
have mixed views on what this means for democracy. As previously discussed, some
view this practice as undercutting constitutional principles, 151 while others view it
as inconsequential 152 or even expected. 153
However, as Edwards argues, the rhetorical presidency may be more limited
in its power to persuade than conventional wisdom suggests. 154 Edwards finds little
support in the literature for the power of presidential rhetoric to significantly move
public opinion. 155 Indeed, after examining public opinion polls assessing presidential actions and approval, as well as legislative initiatives, Edwards finds no systemic
evidence that presidential rhetoric significantly influences public views on either
the president or the president’s initiatives. 156 However, subsequent studies suggest

143. Id. at xxi; see also Moe, The Political Presidency, supra note 4; TULIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 10.
144. NEUSTADT, supra note 104.
145. Skowronek, supra note 45, at 745.
146. TULIS ER AL., supra note 6, at 17–19.
147
Id. at 18; see also Milkis, supra note 12; WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 13.
148. TULIS ET AL., supra note 6.
149. KERNELL, supra note 16, at 3–4; see also WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 13.
150. KERNELL, supra note 16, at 213–42.
151. See, e.g., James W. Ceaser, et al., The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency, 11 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 158 (1981); Hart, supra note 41; Jamieson, supra note 41; Milkis, supra note 12; TULIS ET AL, supra note 6,
at 202–04.
152. GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, ON DEAF EARS: THE LIMITS OF THE BULLY PULPIT? (2006).
153. Garsten, supra note 29, at 174. See also Stuckey, supra note 38.
154. See generally EDWARDS, supra note 152.
155. Id.
156. Id.; see also Andrew W. Barret, Gone Public: The Impact of Going Public on Presidential Legislative Success, 32 AM. POL. RES. 338 (2004).
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that presidential rhetoric can be influential in certain respects, such as when presidents go public on congressional appropriations or simply to improve their standing. 157 In any event, while presidential appeals to the public have some effect, it
may not be the overwhelming influence of the bully pulpit that is frequently assumed, leading some scholars to sound the death knell of the rhetorical presidency.
Although like Mark Twain, the reports of the rhetorical presidency’s death may be
greatly exaggerated. 158
While the ongoing debate about the importance and influence of the rhetorical presidency and the propriety of the administrative presidency are beyond the
scope of this study, the practice of both are unquestioningly relied upon by Obama
in the context of the CPP. The aim of this study, therefore, is to better understand
and explicate the way in which Obama rationalizes his use of the administrative
presidency through the rhetorical presidency. A deeper understanding may reveal
important insights about how the bureaucracy is viewed from the presidential perspective and whether it includes any limits to presidential control. Finally, the study
strives to uncover insights into whether the administrative presidency is simply a
tool of the executive or a reflection of a president’s view of the role of the bureaucracy. Taken together, the deeper understanding and explication of the potentially
potent force of a weaponized bureaucracy may help ensure that it is used wisely in
the preservation, rather than deterioration, of democratic principles.
IV. METHODOLOGY
This Part of the article discusses the iterative, modified grounded theory approach used to analyze Obama’s rhetorical presidency. It begins with a brief overview of grounded theory and proceeds through how Obama’s statements were selected and analyzed. The research presented here is just one part of a larger research project, which covers presidential speeches, memos, executive orders, and
agreements, collectively referred to as presidential statements. This article includes
a smaller subset set of Obama’s speeches, as discussed below.
Insights from approaches used in qualitative social science and rhetorical analysis (typically used in the humanities) informed the methodological approach. This
hybrid approach allowed for the consideration of emergent questions, insights, and
ongoing assessment of the method of analysis. 159 While the administrative presidency, rhetorical presidency, and climate change have been extensively studied
over the past several decades, this is the first research putting the two ideas together to analyze the wicked problem of climate change. Although, scholars have
commented on the need to simultaneously examine the administrative presidency
and rhetorical presidency as executives continue to entrepreneurially create and

157. Brandice Canes-Wrone, The Public Presidency, Personal Approval Ratings, and Policy Making,
34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 477 (2004); see also Jeffery E. Cohen & Richard J. Powell, Building Public Support
from the Grassroots Up: The Impact of Presidential Travel on State-Level Approval, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
11 (2005); B. Dan Wood et al., Presidential Rhetoric and the Economy, 67 J. OF POL. 627 (2005).
158. See WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 13, at 22–24.
159. See generally id.
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enforce public policy. 160 The lack of knowledge specific to this area of study makes
it well suited generally for qualitative analysis and specifically for a modified
grounded theory approach, whereby the data is analyzed inductively to identify
emergent themes that are “grounded” in the data, as opposed to being deductively
verified. 161 Such an approach is similar to the approach scholars might take when
doing discourse analysis. The larger goal of the study was to generate new
knowledge and form a deeper understanding of how presidents explain and promote their policy choices and rationalize their use of the administrative presidency.
An important element of the study, therefore, is the incorporation of rhetorical
analysis as a system of investigation rather than as a specific methodology. 162 As
such, rhetorical analysis in this study was used to explicate arguments for specific
policies and rationalizations of administrative action. 163 In this manner, Obama’s
rhetoric was viewed, in the words of rhetoric scholar Martin Medhurst, as “both a
strategic and a productive art directly related to leadership in public contexts.” 164
The presidential statements analyzed here include Obama’s speeches and
White House statements from December 2009 through October 2011. Presidential
statements were selected based on their content explicitly or implicitly related to
greenhouse gases, climate change, or the Clean Power Plan, as well as related topics, such as energy policy, climate agreements, and executive action when relevant.
In all, twelve presidential statements were selected for analysis. The statements
include a diverse range of public addresses covering Obama’s summation of the
2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Copenhagen (Copenhagen
Climate Summit), State of the Union addresses, speeches articulating energy and
climate policy related to the Waxman-Markey bill, and the Obama administration’s
pivot to a “We Can’t Wait” campaign in the face of an uncooperative Congress. 165
The speeches were read through multiple times each. The first time through
was to become familiar with the topic and delivery of each speech, with subsequent
readings leading to two rounds of coding that were documented in a code book.
The first, or initial, round involved interacting closely with the data to define and
label what is “going on” or being expressed in the statements, including what is said
160. See, e.g., WHITFORD & YATES, supra note 13; see also Vanessa B. Beasley, The Rhetorical Presidency Meets the Unitary Executive: Implications for Presidential Rhetoric on Public Policy, 13 RHETORIC & PUB.
AFFS. 1, 7–35 (2010); Sidney M. Milkis et al., What happened to post-partisanship? Barack Obama and the
New American Party System, 10 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 1, 57–76 (2012).
161. See generally KATHY CHARMAZ, CONSTRUCTING GROUNDED THEORY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE THROUGH
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS (2006); BARNEY G. GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY:
STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1967); KRISTEN LUKER, SALSA DANCING INTO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: RESEARCH IN
AN AGE OF INFO-GLUT (2008); SARAH J. TRACY, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS: COLLECTING EVIDENCE, CRAFTING
ANALYSIS, COMMUNICATING IMPACT (2013).
162. See, e.g., Martin J. Medhurst, Thirty Years Later: A Critic’s Tale, 24 RHETORIC REV. 379, 380–82
(2006), in which Medhurst discusses his move away from theory and method and toward investigation and
explication. As Medhurst explains, “I am interested in substantive matters, which I choose to study through
the instrumentality of rhetoric. To focus on matters of public affairs is to incur the responsibility to understand, as best one can, the factors that contribute to those affairs.” Id. at 381.
163. Id. at 380–82. See also id. at 383 (referring to Thomas W. Benson, Rhetoric and Autobiography: The Case of Malcom X, 60 Q. J. SPEECH 1 (1974)).
164. Id. at 381.
165. See generally Lowande & Milkis, supra note 44.
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and left unsaid. 166 The initial coding was essentially a familiarizing process with the
content of the presidential statements and first step in attaching descriptive characteristics to the data. The second, or focused, round of coding deepened the analysis by synthesizing and focusing the key analytical direction of initial codes. 167 The
outcome of the second round facilitated the connection of the data to theory and
opened the way for a deeper and more explicit understanding of the way key rhetorical elements are rendered in the data. Finally, during the coding cycles, analytic
memos were written to capture observations, insights, and reactions to the data
that served to create the underlying themes in the presidential statements and to
connect the coding, analysis, and findings portions of the research. 168 In other
words, the analytic memos formed the basis for synthesizing the data and established the foundation for building to the findings and outcome of the research. 169
As will be discussed, a number of intriguing codes emerged from this process,
which were then synthesized within three broad streams of rhetorical theory. The
data revealed Obama’s evolving and fluid use of rhetorical approaches to defend
international and domestic action on climate change, promote the WaxmanMarkey bill, and rationalize his use of executive action when the bill was derailed in
the Senate during the summer of 2010. 170 Notably, Obama’s rhetoric took a dramatic turn away from a collaborative and, at times, conciliatory tone of unification
around a common cause, which characterized his pre-Waxman-Markey addresses,
to one of urgency and increasing stridency as he signaled his “going-it-alone” approach to policymaking. 171 Obama’s rhetoric not only coincided with his shifting
strategic emphasis—first deliberation, then executive action—but publicly made
the case for how and why he employed each strategy. As will be argued, such an
approach places Obama within the Wilsonian tradition of governance, which includes both Wilson’s views on the relationship between politics and administration
and his championing of the Progressive Era’s goal of expanding political, social, and
economic opportunities to a more diverse representation of American citizens by
bridging “the gap between the promise of American ideals and the performance of
American political institutions.” 172

166. CHARMAZ, supra note 161, at 115.
167. Id. at 138–40.
168. TRACY, supra note 161, at 184.
169. JOHN W. CRESWELL, QUALITATIVE INQUIRY AND DESIGN: CHOOSING AMONG 5 APPROACHES (2012);
JOHNNY SALDAÑA, THE CODING MANUAL FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCHERS (2013).
170. See infra Part V.C.
171. Other scholars have made similar observations about Obama’s earlier speeches, which they
connected to the themes of community centered on American exceptionalism and the American dream.
See, e.g., James W. Ceaser, The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism, 1 AM. POL. THOUGHT 3
(2012); Jason Gilmore et al., Make No Exception, Save One: American Exceptionalism, the American Presidency, and the Age of Obama, 83 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 505 (2016); JONATHAN D. RIEHL, THE NEXT GREAT
COMMUNICATOR 7 (Nov. 20, 2018), http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/6/7/2/pages256720/p256720-1.php; Deborah F. Atwater, Senator Barack Obama: The Rhetoric of
Hope and the American Dream, 38 J. BLACK STUD. 121, 121 (2007).
172. George W. Ruiz, The Ideological Convergence of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson,
19 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 159 (1989).
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V. FINDINGS
Multiple rhetorical categories emerged from the data, indicative of Obama’s
impressive and diverse array of rhetorical approaches throughout his presidency.
This study focuses specifically on Obama’s use of polysemy and locus of the irreparable as the most prominent rhetorical approaches of the speeches analyzed. Notably, Obama employs numerous approaches in his speeches and, while they will
not be analyzed in detail, the various connections to rhetorical theory will be highlighted. The following section begins with an overview of what polysemy is in rhetorical theory and then progresses with an analysis of Obama’s use of the rhetorical
approach in promoting his climate policies. Throughout the analysis, the emergent
codes are contextualized alongside specific quotations that capture the sense in
which they are used and discussed in relation to how they connect to rhetorical
theory. The connection to theory is important for understanding how Obama animates his rhetorical presidency and rationalizes his use of the administrative presidency. The section concludes with a discussion of possible theoretical connections
to public administration, which serves to synthesize the research findings with
broader public administration scholarship.
A. The Rhetorical Use of Polysemy
As with many of his speeches during the early years of his administration,
Obama engaged in a form of rhetorical dance as he finessed arguments about clean
energy and climate change rather than attempting to debunk opposition altogether. 173 Obama’s more circumscribed arguments at this time were intended to
channel attention away from divisive positions and shape perceptions about energy
policy through his careful framing of policy choices. Obama attempted this maneuver with a careful use of polysemy, especially through strategic ambiguity, to appeal
to disparate points of view. Polysemy is the concept of attaching different fundamental understandings to a single, unifying message. 174 Thus, a message that is strategically ambiguous appeals to multiple understandings originating from diverse
points of view—dramatically so in the case of climate change—without having to
resolve, or even address, the inherent differences among them. In other words, the
message has a little something for everyone and does not require the various interests to give up firmly held beliefs.
Obama’s strategic ambiguity can be seen in his appeals to both those advocating swift and significant action against climate change as well as those concerned
with harmful economic impacts of doing so. The appeal to the disparate interests
was then wrapped in a patriotic sentiment of American exceptionalism as captured
in the following excerpt: “Even if you doubt the evidence, providing incentives for
energy efficiency and clean energy are the right thing to do for our future, because
173. See, e.g., Robert L. Ivie, Obama at West Point: A Study in Ambiguity of Purpose, 14 RHETORIC
& PUB. AFF. 727, 732 (2011) (recounting Obama’s West Point speech and treating drug use as a health issue).
174. See generally Leah Ceccarelli, Polysemy: Multiple Meanings in Rhetorical Criticism, 84 Q. J.
SPEECH 395 (1998); Celeste M. Condit, The Rhetorical Limits of Polysemy, 6 CRIT. STUD. MASS COMM. 103
(1989).
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the nation that leads the clean energy economy will be the nation that leads the
global economy. And America must be that nation.” 175
For good measure, Obama then adds that if all else fails Americans need to
act on behalf of their children and grandchildren (coded as “Transgenerational
Trust” as discussed below) to provide them with a safe and secure future. 176 In these
statements, Obama was shaping the attitude of American citizens. As Ivie observes,
“[a]ttitude was embryonic action,” and Obama rhetorically shapes that attitude in
order to gain support for his energy and climate policies. 177 As he shapes attitudes,
Obama also recognizes that transforming America’s energy policy would be a longterm and difficult task. Thus, his motif of a clean energy revolution is tempered with
a dose of realism as he observes, “Americans also understand that the problems we
face didn't happen overnight, and so we're not going to solve them all overnight
either.” 178
B. A Clean Energy Utopia
Consistent with his circumscribed approach to strategic ambiguity, Obama
also treats climate change in his early speeches as mostly an afterthought, as if it
were a minor actor in the “clean energy revolution.” 179 In his familiar, easy and controlled manner, 180 Obama observes, “...oh, and by the way, [being the leader in
clean energy] also solves the climate problem.” 181 Obama’s casual reference reveals
a sensitivity to the deep ideological divide of climate change views in the U.S. and
an understanding that focusing on the divide makes agreement more difficult. 182 As
such, Obama attempts to focus attention on what Americans have in common in
order to obviate the need to resolve what Americans do not. Thus, prior to the Waxman-Markey Bill failing in the Senate, Obama argues that actions to address climate
change are not simply ideological or climate catastrophism, they are instead pragmatic. 183 They are a path to broader economic prosperity and security that also
“solves the climate problem.” 184 In other words, such actions are “smart” regardless
of what anyone thinks about climate change and help solidify the argument that a
175. President Barack Obama, Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union (Jan. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Obama, 2010 State of the Union Address] (transcript available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201000055/pdf/DCPD-201000055.pdf).
176. Id.
177.
Ivie, supra note 173, at 732.
178. President Barack Obama, Remarks in Las Vegas (Oct. 24, 2011) [hereinafter Obama, 2011 Las
Vegas
Remarks]
(transcript
available
at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD201100787/pdf/DCPD-201100787.pdf).
179. President Barack Obama, Remarks on Health Care Reform and Climate Change (Dec. 19,
2009) [hereinafter Obama, Health Care Reform and Climate Change] (transcript available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/DCPD-200901007).
180. Joshua Gunn, On Speech and Public Release, 13 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 175, 196 (2010).
181. President Barack Obama, Interview with Jim Lehrer on PBS’ “The News Hour” (Dec. 23, 2009)
[hereinafter Obama, Lehrer Interview] (transcript available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-jim-lehrer-pbs-the-news-hour).
182. See, e.g., EZRA MARKOWITZ ET AL., CONNECTING ON CLIMATE: A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE CHANGE
COMMUNICATION 1 (2014), http://ecoamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/ecoAmerica-CRED-2014Connecting-on-Climate.pdf.
183. Obama, Lehrer Interview, supra note 181.
184. Id.
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“clean energy economy” will satisfy economic, environmental, social, and intergenerational obligations.
Obama’s strategic ambiguity also incorporates his campaign motif of “hope
and change,” which is seen in his speech addressing the outcome of the Copenhagen Climate Summit. 185 By almost all accounts the summit was a dismal failure because of its lack of substantive agreement. 186 However, Obama characterizes the
outcome in more hopeful terms by noting that it was the “first time in history that
all of the . . . world’s major economies have come together to accept their responsibility to take action to confront the threat of climate change.” 187 Referencing “extremely difficult and complex negotiations,” Obama concludes that the summit
would lay the “foundation for international action in the years to come.” 188 These
statements were coded as “Collective Action,” a theme that Obama frequently revisits to link U.S. action on climate change with broader international action, without which the efforts of any individual nation would not have an appreciable impact
on global greenhouse gas emissions or resulting global temperatures. 189 In the same
speech, Obama shifts to a message of opportunity in America where developing a
“clean energy economy” and leading the clean energy revolution would potentially
“create millions of new jobs [and] power new industries.” 190 Obama also reasons in
later speeches that “whoever builds a clean energy economy, whoever is at the
forefront of that, is going to own the twenty-first century global economy.” 191 The
binary nature of collective international action and American dominance continue
the idea of strategic ambiguity where collaboration and fierce economic competitiveness coexist in the clean energy economy. Such statements became a recurring
theme for Obama and also indicate a strategic use of utopian rhetoric—coded as
“Clean Energy Utopia”—to make an economic, nationalistic, and ultimately pragmatic argument, as discussed below, for transitioning to low-carbon energy.
In a broader context, the theme invokes patriotic, American traditions linked
to the founding of the nation where unity is emphasized over diversity. 192 This emphasis is a continuation of Obama’s campaign speeches where he de-emphasized
the differences among Americans and instead argued that their core identity is
simply that of being an American. 193 Such an emphasis on unity supports Obama’s
185. President Barack Obama, Address at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (Dec.
18,
2009)
[hereinafter
Obama,
2009
Copenhagen
Address]
(available
at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xkHRU4pcSvA).
186. See, e.g., Why Did Copenhagen Fail to Deliver a Climate Deal?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2009, 4:33
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8426835.stm.
187. Obama, 2009 Copenhagen Address, supra note 185.
188. Id.
189. RAJENDRA K. PACHAURI ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 17 (Rajendra K. Pachauri et al. eds., 2015), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf.
190. Obama, 2009 Copenhagen Address, supra note 185.
191. President Barack Obama, Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Fundraiser Question-and-Answer Session (Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Obama, 2010 DNC Q&A Session] (transcript available
at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/DCPD-201000079).
192. RIEHL, supra note 171.
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argument that there are many compelling economic, environmental, and social reasons to adopt a clean energy economy where all interests are better off than the
status quo. As Obama reasons during an interview with Jim Lehrer on PBS’s The
News Hour, there is much work to be done in the area of climate policy, but adds,
“my main responsibility here is to convince the American people that it is smart
economics and it is going to be the engine of our economic growth for us to be a
leader in clean energy.” 194 These types of statements were coded as “Voice of Reason” because they reflect a view that recognizes the difficulty of the task ahead but
sees clearly through the inherent complexity and conflict of climate policy toward
a rational solution where everyone benefits. Obama is essentially standing above
the fray pointing the way to the “smart” and inevitable expansion of a clean energy
economy.
In carrying his polysemous message to the American public, Obama articulates
his version of the American Dream, framed in this case by a clean energy revolution
that emphasizes community over individualism. 195 The communal responsibility is
expressed by governmental action to set in motion a clean energy economy that
will help people, including the children, realize their own American dream. 196 And
by being the “Voice of Reason,” Obama makes a rational, yet inspirational, appeal
for the “smart choice” that will improve economic conditions, protect the children,
and solve the climate crisis. 197 Such an approach has been characterized as the process of “persuading through reason, and motivating through emotion.” 198 It is also
embryonic action that Obama intends to translate into policy action by making strategically ambiguous appeals to diverse interests.
C. The Rhetorical Use of Locus of the Irreparable
Once the Waxman-Markey Bill stalled in the Senate during the summer of
2010, Obama’s rhetoric takes a noticeable turn that signals a pivot away from legislation and toward administrative action. One gets an early glimpse of where
Obama is headed when he offers support of the Waxman-Markey Bill and the Senate’s rejection of Senator Murkowski’s amendment to prohibit EPA from regulating
CO2 as a pollutant, along with other greenhouse gases from stationary sources. 199
The noteworthy aspect of Obama’s statement is his emphasis on the distinction between progress toward a “clean energy economy,” a direction that will also protect
194. Obama, Lehrer Interview, supra note 181.
195. See, e.g., Atwater, supra note 171, at 121. Atwater explicates Obama’s version of the American Dream. Id. In the case of clean energy transitions to address climate change, Obama connects the
American Dream to energy and all the benefits to society of bringing a clean energy revolution to fruition.
196. Id. at 127. In describing Obama’s views of politics and governance, Atwater explains, “For
him, the Constitution envisions a road map by which we marry passion to reason, the ideal of individual
freedom to the demands of the community. His explanation for being a Democrat is simply this, ‘It is this
idea that our communal values, our sense of mutual responsibility and social solidarity should also be expressed through our government.’” It is this core understanding, predicated on community, of the relationship between governance and the governed that Obama brings to his policies on energy and climate change.
197. DICK WIRTHLIN & WYNTON C. HALL, THE GREATEST COMMUNICATOR: WHAT RONALD REAGAN TAUGHT ME
ABOUT POLITICS, LEADERSHIP, AND LIFE 32, 56 (Wiley ed. 2005).
198. RIEHL, supra note 171, at 9.
199. Tim Dickinson, Climate Bill, R.I.P, ROLLING STONE (July 21, 2010), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/climate-bill-r-i-p-190512/.
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the children, and regressing “backward to the same failed policies that have left our
Nation increasingly dependent on foreign oil.” 200 As a result, Obama’s message
clearly highlights a choice between, on the one hand, safety, security, and prosperity and, on the other hand, a society stuck in reverse, clinging to its coal and oil. At
this stage, the Waxman-Markey Bill was floundering in the Senate, and Obama was
being roundly criticized by the environmental community for not taking a stronger
position on climate change, with Rolling Stone even accusing Obama of “lead[ing]
from behind on climate change.” 201
In the spring of 2011, Obama began to signal a new policy direction at a Democratic National Convention fundraiser in San Francisco. 202 In that address, Obama
strikes a tone of increasing impatience and urgency, stating:
There are climate change deniers in Congress, and when the economy gets
tough, sometimes environmental issues drop from people's radar screens.
But I don't think there's any doubt that unless we are able to move forward
in a serious way on clean energy that we're putting our children and our
grandchildren at risk. 203
By the time Obama addressed the United Nations General Assembly in September 2011, he had turned his attention from Congress to the international community and unilateral executive action. 204 For example, in his speech to the United
Nations, Obama declares:
To preserve our planet, we must not put off action that climate change
demands. We have to tap the power of science to save those resources
that are scarce. And together, we must continue our work to build on the
progress made in Copenhagen and Cancun, so that all the major economies here today follow through on the commitments that were made. Together, we must work to transform the energy that powers our economies
and support others as they move down that path. That is what our commitment to the next generation demands. 205
In this short paragraph, Obama reiterates in summary fashion a number of the
statements he made beginning in 2009. These statements were coded as “We Can’t
Wait,” “All of the Above Energy,” “Collective Action,” and “Transgenerational
Trust.” As discussed above, the “Collective Action” code captures the idea that con200. President Barack Obama, Statement on Senate Action on Energy Legislation (June 10, 2010)
[hereinafter Obama, June 2010 Statement]. (transcript available at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/DCPD-201000479).
201. Dickinson, supra note 199.
202. See President Barack Obama, Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Fundraiser in
San Francisco, California (April 20, 2011) [hereinafter Obama, April 2011 Remarks] (transcript available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/DCPD-201100273).
203. Id.
204. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Clinton Global Initiative Annual Meeting in New
York City (Sept. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Obama, Sept. 2011 Remarks] (transcript available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/DCPD-201100668).
205. Id.
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sequential action addressing climate change requires the collective effort of all nations acting together, while “All of the Above” underscores the idea that all forms
of energy are on the table thus attempting to assuage the economic and energy
security concerns of those invested in traditional energy sources. The “We Can’t
Wait” code captures the sense that the time to act is now, and delay will bring the
world to a point of no return at which climate catastrophism is inevitable.
Such appeals can be grouped under a general rhetorical appeal to the “locus
of the irreparable.” 206 The use of locus of the irreparable in rhetoric seeks to motivate those less willing to act with requisite urgency, as well as to convert those who
are less committed to a no action alternative. 207 Just as there are diverse views
about climate policy, there are equally diverse views about how urgently action
should be taken on those policies. 208 Of those interested in the policies, some will
be motivated to take immediate action, while others will be less committed. 209 Of
those less committed, some will be interested but not quite ready to commit to
action. 210 Still others, while not holding opposing views, will be more or less ambivalent. 211 Taken together, this large group of the public requires a compelling reason
to get behind urgent action. 212 Obama’s appeal in the “We Can’t Wait” campaign is
directed at this large group and the locus of the irreparable is his rhetorical approach to winning them over. The locus of the irreparable captures the idea that
not acting now means foreclosing the opportunity to act in the future. 213 In this
case, Obama is arguing that the consequences of not acting now through a clean
energy economy lead to a future where actions will no longer be effective. It will
be too late to secure a bright economic future for America and safety for the children.
Locus of the irreparable also captures the notion that what is lost cannot be
replaced. 214 Accordingly, it speaks to the uniqueness of what is lost and demands
exceptional action to ensure it persists. 215 This, of course, echoes the precautionary
principle but in a more urgent way because it suggests that the outcome is definite
and promises that it cannot be reversed. 216 The locus of the irreparable also implies
that a limit is fast approaching and highlights the precarious nature of the situation,
which demands immediate action. 217 Yet, despite the urgency, there is hope that
what is threatened need not be lost and can be preserved by an “agent’s active
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207. Id. at 92.
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intervention to ensure its continued existence.” 218 Finally, the locus of the irreparable frames the issue in such a way that it focuses attention on the objects of shared
agreement, rather than those of disagreement, and places society in a position of
looking beyond itself at two future possibilities separated by one fateful action. 219
In the spring of 2011, Obama began employing the locus of the irreparable to
signal a full pivot to administrative action in the face of an uncooperative Congress.
As noted above, Obama was growing increasingly impatient and he underscored
the need for immediate action by calling out members of Congress who were no
longer focused on climate policy. 220
Then, in introducing his “We Can’t Wait” campaign, Obama makes a stark shift
in both style and substance by proclaiming, “We can’t wait for an increasingly dysfunctional Congress to do its job. Where they won’t act, I will.” 221 In his speech,
which was focused on jobs and the economy but alluded to other policies as well,
Obama embraces a level of stridency and unilateral action that were absent in earlier speeches when he struck a more collaborative, even conciliatory, tone with Congress and the American people. Obama did not completely pull back from Congress,
rather he offered an alternative path that he was willing to pursue should Congress
continue to ignore his policies. However, Obama was clear about his intent should
Congress not do what he called “the right thing” when he proclaimed:
But we can't wait for that action. I'm not going to wait for it. So I'm going
to keep on taking this message across the country. Where we don't have
to wait for Congress, we're just going to go ahead and act on our own. And
we're going to keep on putting pressure on Congress to do the right thing
for families all across the country. 222
In addition to “We Can’t Wait,” these statements were coded as “Going it
Alone” to capture the idea that Obama was focused on administrative action as
much as, if not more, than legislative action. Indeed, over the course of the next
year, the Obama administration produced no less than forty-five distinct executive
actions, ranging from executive orders and presidential memos to recess appointments and waivers. 223 With respect to climate change, Obama had already begun
to work through the EPA to achieve the goals of the Waxman-Markey Bill and
emerging international climate agreements. While Obama’s plan for executive action on climate change would not be revealed until June of 2013, the Obama administration was already laying the groundwork for the release of “the President’s
Climate Action Plan” and a related presidential memo directing the EPA to regulate
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CO2 emissions from the power sector. 224 The EPA issued its regulations to do so
under the Clean Power Plan. 225
Also worthy of note is that with his rhetorical shift, Obama was now “speaking
over the heads of Congress” to appeal directly to and motivate the American people
reasoning, “And that's why [we] need all of . . . [these major voices]. Tell Congress
to stop playing politics and start taking action on jobs.” 226 This statement was coded
as “Populist Appeals” to capture direct appeals to the public to intervene in the
policymaking process. The line seems fairly standard for a president attempting to
get Congress to budge on a gridlocked policy. However, it becomes a more populist
overture when Obama sets up Congress as the foil for not doing “the right thing” of
passing legislation that would otherwise help the American people. 227 Such an approach is consistent with the way in which Tulis envisions the rhetorical presidency
functioning when policies fail to gain traction in Congress. 228 Whether populist or
not, Obama’s combined use of the rhetorical and administrative presidency moved
the executive branch closer to what has been described as an “executive party system” that appeals to partisan support as it adopts partisan policies. 229 Perhaps more
profoundly, in light of Trump’s actions to unravel the Clean Power Plan, the combination advances a new paradigm where unilateral action becomes the “habitual solution to partisan polarization.” 230
D. Connections to Administrative Theory
Hearkening back to Kettl’s typology, partisan appeals are consistent with the
Wilsonian view of governance, especially with respect to how presidents view the
role of the bureaucracy in implementing policy. Wilson’s articulation of the politicsadministration dichotomy was a reaction against partisan politics implemented
through political patronage, a view that is consistent with the original meaning of
the dichotomy advocated by the civil service reformers of the late 1800s. 231 In this
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view, free from “politics” means free from partisan, electoral politics, not the policies that are a natural outgrowth of democratic outcomes. 232 In other words, Wilson
and the reformers envisioned a bureaucracy free from the influence of “boss”-led,
partisan politics operating from a posture of neutral competence, while recognizing
that genuine neutral competence means "loyalty that argues back.” 233 Viewed in
this light, the dichotomy never envisioned an administration devoid of politics or
policymaking. 234 In fact, as expressed by Wilson, “Our own politics must be the
touchstone for all theories. The principles on which to base a science of administration for America must be principles which have democratic policy very much at
heart.” 235 Thus, a Wilsonian understanding of the politics-administration dichotomy
is one in which administrative agencies grapple with vexing policy choices set forth
by political leaders. Of course, this means that rather than partisan “bosses” directing extra-constitutional institutions, such policy choices would instead be the priorities of an acting president, as principle, expressed through the actions of administrative agencies, as agent. 236 In announcing his “We Can’t Wait” policy of administrative action, Obama was simply following a model of governance in the Wilsonian
tradition as he pivoted to administrative action via the EPA.
In further support of this conclusion, Woodrow Wilson theorized as much
about presidential rhetoric as he did administrative action. 237 As expressed by Wilson, “Policy—where there is no absolute an arbitrary ruler to do the choosing for a
whole people—means massed opinion, and the forming of the mass is the whole
are and mastery of politics.” 238 In other words, rather than being the handmaiden
of public opinion, the rhetorical presidency was instead the mechanism by which
public opinion would be both formed and informed. Such an approach would necessarily involve fathoming the will of the people, which may only be vaguely known
to them, and interpreting that opinion in order to inform public policy and, in the
case of this study, rationalize unilateral executive action. 239 The rhetorical president
would then educate and persuade the populace by connecting public desire with
public policy. 240 This is precisely the approach that Obama took when he observed:
[M]ost Americans also understand that the problems we face didn't happen overnight, and so we're not going to solve them all overnight either.
What people don't understand though is why some elected officials in
Washington don't seem to . . . share the same sense of urgency that people
all around the country [share]. 241
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Then, connecting his interpreted sense of public opinion and expressing it as
both executive action and public mobilization, Obama concluded:
But we can't wait for that action. I'm not going to wait for it. So I'm going
to keep on taking this message across the country. Where we don't have
to wait for Congress, we're just going to go ahead and act on our own. And
we're going to keep on putting pressure on Congress to do the right thing
for families all across the country. And I am confident that the American
people want to see action. We know what to do. The question is whether
we're going to have the political will to do it. 242
Thus, with the “We Can’t Wait” campaign, we see Obama in the Wilsonian
tradition educating, informing, and mobilizing the support of the populace by rhetorically rationalizing his administrative pivot. The force behind this dual action of
rhetoric and policy is an executive party system that readily moves forward when
Congress stands pat. The effect of which is a governance determined by party, especially where highly politicized issues are concerned. This is not to say that such
governance is improper. The post-New Deal application of the administrative state
to make and interpret rules in lieu of Congressional action has been widely supported by both scholars and the courts. 243 Indeed, practical considerations, such as
time and expertise, require administrative agencies to promulgate rules that would
ordinarily cripple Congress. 244 Further, administrative action, while at times favoring narrow interests, also serves national interests. 245
However, it does mean increasingly partisan governance characterized by an
expanding gap between deliberation about national priorities and the adoption of
rules reflecting more partisan views about those policies. Meanwhile, that gap represents a hardening of political differences that becomes the justification for executive action. In this case, rather than signaling new rounds of negotiation, the breakdown in deliberation signaled legislation by other means—that is, administrative
action as the “habitual solution to partisan polarization.” Thus, the interaction of
the policy captured by the pivot and the corresponding political language rationalizing it combine to create a reciprocal relationship that, as described by Stuckey, “is
capable of reconstituting the reality in which those things are embedded.” 246 And
that reality has become one in which presidents are justified in taking unilateral
action when the partisan divide is too wide for Congress to cross.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This study began with a focus on better understanding and explicating the way
in which President Obama rationalized his use of the administrative presidency
through the rhetorical presidency. The study endeavored to uncover how Obama
viewed the bureaucracy, especially with respect to whether any limits remain to
presidential control over it, and whether the administrative presidency was simply
an expedient tool in the hands of an entrepreneurial president or a reflection of
that president’s view of governance. Clearly, Obama viewed the EPA as an expedient way to move climate policy that he would have preferred to enact through Congress. In other words, administrative action to Obama was simply legislation by
other means, and he used what he characterized as the looming and irreversible
impacts of climate change and economic loss as justification for not only speaking
over the heads of Congress but bypassing it altogether. However, in addition to the
pragmatic leveraging of administrative action, there are a number of telling observations that can be drawn from the findings.
First, by pivoting to executive action Obama was continuing a well-preserved
presidential tradition of implementing policy by any means necessary. Yet, merely
continuing the tradition is a far less compelling observation than the way in which
he continued it. Indeed, Obama’s approach draws fascinating parallels with Woodrow Wilson’s progressive philosophy. Wilson saw the office of the president as a
unifying force—both the leader of the nation and the leader of his party. 247 As such,
Wilson not only saw his role as leading the nation, but also as shaping national views
to reflect his own. 248 Obama assumed a similar view of his role as president and
attempted to shape national views on climate policy while Congress deliberated the
Waxman-Markey bill. However, as a reformer in the Wilsonian tradition, Obama
readily adapted to a disinterested Congress, and largely unmotivated public, by addressing an urgent problem on his own that was predictably interpreted as an indirect attack on the customs and conventions of democratic principles. 249 And we
now see the “counterattack” as an opposing party undoes executive action by executive action.
The swing of this political pendulum leads to the second observation, which
confirms what others have observed as a system of policy formulation and adoption
achieved through an executive party system. 250 If all policy is now partisan policy,
then deliberation is now an anachronism or, at best, something that should be attempted but not favored. Accordingly, unilateral action is justified whenever Congress ignores, ineffectively addresses, or altogether opposes presidential overtures.
It is in this space where the interaction of the administrative presidency and the
rhetorical presidency become particularly profound. That is, when administrative
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action becomes the default means by which policy is formulated, adopted, implemented, and defended, then a president’s rhetoric may serve to harden the divide
rather than unify the populace. Thus, unlike the progressive era ideals, populist appeals are in reality partisan appeals, while rhetoric is weaponized, along with the
bureaucracy, to gain and exploit any advantage to keep and wield power. This is the
demagoguery our Founding Fathers were concerned about, and it is the demagoguery we may now face as the administrative presidency and rhetorical presidency
become business as usual. At this juncture, Congress has the means but not the will
to address the very manifestation of what the Founding Fathers feared. The result
of which ultimately means that wicked policy problems will remain unsettled and
national interests will suffer from the absence of robust deliberation.
Finally, it would be a mistake to conclude that Obama’s rhetoric was in any
way ineffectual. Notwithstanding whatever manifestations Obama’s rhetorical
presidency has on future presidencies and democratic principles, his rhetoric at
least signaled a policy direction that, even though it fell short of implementation,
likely influenced future energy decisions. 251 Indeed, while the Clean Power Plan was
never implemented, its CO2 reduction goals remain on target due to a combination
of policy, market, and regulatory forces. 252 What has been understudied is the degree to which the threat of policy action motivated the electricity industry to begin
to move away from coal. While it is well publicized that states are increasingly taking action to reduce CO2 emissions, less publicized is the fact that major electric
utilities that have traditionally relied upon coal-fired generation are making similar
decisions. 253 Policy, market, shareholder, and regulatory factors certainly combined
to influence these low-carbon moves, but it is also likely that such moves were
made in anticipation of future CO2 regulation, which Obama ultimately may be responsible for ushering in rhetorically, if not administratively. If that is the case, then
the administrative and rhetorical presidencies must be viewed simultaneously if we
are to understand them fully.
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